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Tommy Burns as a
Military Leader
A Case Study using
Integrative Complexity
J .L. Granatstein and Peter Suedfeld

L

ieutenant-General E.L.M. Burns is
relatively well-known to Canadian
military historians and to Canadians
generally. A professional soldier born in
1897, Tommy Burns attended the Royal
Military College, leaving before graduation to
serve with the Canadian Corps in France and
Flanders during the Great War. He saw much
action, won the Military Cross, and decided to
remain in the tiny Canadian Permanent Force
after the Armistice. Burns rose with rapidity
in the interwar years, his career helped by
brilliant performance at the British Army
Staff College, Quetta, and selection for the
Imperial Defence College, London. He had
powerful patrons, senior officers such as Harry
Crerar who admired his intelligence and skills
as a staff officer, traits that occasionally
camouflaged his sarcasm and lack of
traditional leadership qualities of the kind
that can make men willing to follow an officer
into battle.
At the same time, Burns' restless mind
was searching for other outlets. He began
writing articles in H.L. Mencken's American
Mercury, the magazine of the 1920s. He
published a play and a novel, and he wrote
sketches for the theatre. And at the same
time, the Canadian Defence Quarterly, the
military's one interwar intellectual outlet,
featured a stimulating debate on the use of
armour between Burns and a young captain,
Guy Simonds, who was to develop into the
best general Canada was to produce in World
War II. Burns, in other words was a man of
parts.

At the outbreak of war in 1939, LieutenantColonel Burns was in Britain attending the
Imperial Defence College. He soon had himself
attached to the Canadian High Commission,
preparing for the arrival of the first Canadian
contingent. In mid-1940 he returned to
Canada to work for the new Chief of the
General Staff, General Crerar, as a colonel,
and the next year he took the plum position
of Brigadier General Staff to LieutenantGeneral A.G.L. McNaughton, commanding
the Canadian Corps in the United Kingdom.
Burns' career was on the rise-until postal
censors in May 1941 intercepted mail to his
mistress in Montreal and took exception to
some of Brigadier Burns' views about the
war, British commanders, and Canadian
attitudes. Returned to Canada in disgrace,
Burns narrowly escaped court-martial though
he was reduced in rank to colonel.
Such a blow might have finished the career
of a lesser man, but Burns rose again to
become a brigade commander, a division
commander in Britain and in Italy, and then
in early 1944 commander ofl Canadian Corps
as it fought its way up the Italian boot.
Burns' men helped break the Hitler Line and
successfully cracked the Gothic Line, major
battles that ought to have made his reputation.
It was not to be. Burns never got on with his
"huntin' and fishin'" British superiors, and
his personality failed to impress itself on
either his division commanders or his troops.
A British attempt to get rid of him in July
1944 was blocked only be a major effort on
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the part of General Crerar, commanding First
Canadian Army, who despatched the Chief of
Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters,
London, Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart,
to Italy to investigate. Stuart did so, talking
not only to British officers but also discussing
Burns' performance with his subordinates. A
second attempt to oust Burns, this one
initiated by his senior Canadian field and
staff officers in October 1944, was more
successful, and Burns, relieved of his
command and reduced in rank to majorgeneral at the beginning of November, spent
the final months of the war in unimportant
rear area positions.
After the war, Burns worked for the
Department of Veterans Affairs in Ottawa,
ultimately becoming its deputy minister, and
then as commander of the United Nations
Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine.
In November 1956, in the midst of the Suez
Crisis, he created the United Nations
Emergency Force that helped restore a kind
of peace to the Egyptian-Israeli border. His
reputation on the rise again, Burns regained
his rank of lieutenant-general and in 1960
became
Canada's Ambassador for
Disarmament. By the time of his death in
1986, he was a much revered figure.'
Most of this is reasonably well-known,
not least through Burns' own voluminous (if
relatively discreet) contemporaneous and
autobiographical writings. 2 But what was
going through his mind when he was writing
in crisis? What if we could assess his ability
to make decisions and to process the flood of
information that fell upon him at the crucial
points in his career? Moreover, what if we
could compare how Burns acted in crisis and
how he wrote about it later?
Military leadership and its failings have
always fascinated scholars. Consider N.F.
Dixon's well-known On the Psychology of
Military Incompetence (London, 1979) which
looked devastatingly at British commanders
of the last two hundred years. To Dixon,
neurotic authoritarians were virtually doomed
to fail as leaders because of their obstinate
rigidity, their compulsive desire for control,
their inability to cope with dissonance, and

their stubborn anti-intellectualism.
Psychologists quarrel with the lack of
empirical rigidity in Dixon's analyses, but
they note approvingly that he recognized that
personality characteristics interact with
environmental factors. Dixon talked about
the information overload that frequently
overwhelms commanders, and he understood
that biological and physical factors, not least
illness and sensory impairment, affect
decision-making. Can Dixon be taken a step
further?
Psychologists who have studied cognitive
functioning and decision-making have
developed ways of measuring what they call
integrative complexity. Integrative complexity,
roughly definable as the ability to process
information, ranges from rigid, egocentric,
poorly differentiated judgements at the simple
end of the continuum to flexible, integrative
and empathetic responses at the complex
end. Such a tool can readily be applied to
political leadership in international crises 3
and to generalship. 4 The complexity of a
commanders, we may hypothesize, is related
to the likelihood that he will be influenced by
other matters as well. These include the
strength of his own and the opposing forces
and the skills-not least in informationprocessing-of the commander on the other
side of the hill.
At the simplest end of the complexity
continuum, we might expect to find a rigid,
authoritarian officer, one who "goes by the
book" and acts without considering all
available information and all possible plans.
Is this necessarily self-defeating? Perhaps,
but not necessarily so. there are situation in
which this approach could be the most
adaptive. It allows rapid decision-making
and, with obvious self-confidence, it
concentrates on a few salient issues and
items of information, and allows for no
vacillation or weakness. C.S. Foresters'
fictional character in The General is a perfect
prototype.
A highly complex commander, on the other
hand, will seek out and process much more
information, develop and monitor plans more
flexibly and creatively, and be better able to
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anticipate the reactions of his opponent. His
weaknesses may include an unwillingness to
stop searching for information and to make a
firm decision, being led astray by minor bits
of information, and the appearance of being
unsure of his own mind.
The implications of studying integrative
complexity should be clear.
If the
psychologists are correct in their approach,
we might expect that innovativeness, tactical
flexibility, an ability to read the apparent
tactical plans and mind of the opponent, and
a willingness to seek out information and to
consider it seriously will be very helpful to a
commander with a high level of complexity.
Skill at information processing, in other words,
can bring victory, especially against a superior
foe or when a difficult situation requires an
especially creative approach. By the same
token, the virtues associated with a low level
of complexity-doggedness, a refusal to
consider being distracted by too much
information, and a penchant for a
straightforward strategy-might well lead to
success in some campaigns.
But how can we measure integrative
complexity retroactively? In fact, although
they are virtually unknown to historians,
many studies by psychologist have done so,

Above and Below: Lieutenant -GeneralE.L.M. "Tommy"
Bums in Italy, March 1944.

taking samples of the subject's writing and
scoring they paragraph by paragraph along a
scale with nodal points of 1 (very low
differentiation), 3 (differentiation, no
integration), 5 (differentiation, some
integration), and 7 (high levels of
differentiation and integration). Transitional
scores (2, 4 or 6) are assigned to passages
that show some aspects of the next higher
nodal score but do not clearly meet the criteria
for that score. Any connected verbal discourse
can be scored for integrative complexity in
this way, and trained scorers can do the task
with a high degree of inter-scorer agreement. 5
Table 1 gives an example of Burns' writing at
each of the four main nodal points.
With Burns we are fortunate to have both
material he wrote contemporaneously as well
as memoirs written some 15 years later. This
allows analysis and comparison of Burns'
three major professional crises during the
1941-1945 period: his near court-martial in
65
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Table 1
Examples of Complexity Scoring
One point of view, dismissal of opposing
perspective. Score=l

Synthesis of two contradictory aims by a
combined solution. Score=5

"Captain Hart sets down a myopic argument
to the effect that Foch was converted from the
"Napoleonic fallacy" and led to give more
importance to "economic objectives" by the
experience in the Ruhr. How a "war" in which
one of the combatants had no army (or none
to speak of) can prove anything about war in
general, I am unable to see." (from Burns'
review of B.H. Lidell Hart's the remaking of
Modern Armies in Canadian Defence
Quarterly, October 1927.)

'The solution to these opposed requirements is to
advance on a broad front and concentrate the
attack. The extent of front on which it is possible to
attack is usually determined by the number ofguns
and tanks available; but it should be as wide as
possible, consistent with effective neutralisation of
the enemy Small Arms and mortar fire and
adequate tank support." (Burns' "Notes on
Tactical Methods," October 1944.)

Consideration of different aspects and
dimensions, acceptance of conflict or
disagreement. Score=3
"In the space available I have not been able to
deal fully with the "Napoleonic fallacy" theory,
but no doubt enough has been said-perhaps
too much- for this chapter in Captain Hart's book
is only 23 pages of 312, and the rest is invariably
sensible, persuasive, and full of suggestive ideas.
Particularly interesting are the chapters on light
tanks, gas, infantry tactics, and training... 'The
Dominions and Mechanisation" should excite a
good deal of argument. Capt. Hart suggests that as
the purpose of the Dominion forces is primarily
defensive, motortsed machine gun battalions would
give a more valuable return for the money expended
than the present orthodox though only partially
organized forces of all arms." (Ibid.)

1941, the British criticism of his leadership
in June 1944, and the revolt of his division
commanders in September-October 1944. 6
In the first of these, Burns' personal
indiscretion in 1941, we find increased
complexity in correspondence he wrote at the
time. This reaction, commonly found among
outstanding men facing such crises, reflects
a mustering of intellectual resources to
consider the dimensions and details of a
problem and how to solve it. 7
Upon
reinstatement ofthe upward path of his career,

Consideration of different dimensions,
combined solution using higher-order
categorization schemata.' Score=7
"It must be remembered that as the fighting troops

are increasingly composed of reinforcement who
have not had company and platoon training, nor
training in co-operation with tanks, the type of
operation must be simplified. Highly trained troops
can fight their way forward, by companys, calling
down artillery concentrations and making plans to
overcome each situation, and this can frequently be
done with small losses. But when most of the troops
are only partially trained simplicity must be the
keynote, together with heavy fire support. The
simplest form of attack is for the infantry and tanks
to follow a heavy barrage closely, going straight
through to an objective, only clearing out the enemy
lying directly in the path. But this must be combined
with thorough mopping up." (Ibid.)

Burns' complexity level also went up, the
result of coping successfully with the new
and complicated problems he faced and
mastered as a brigade and division
commander.
His complexity then decreased during his
time as Corps commander, a time of almost
constant professional criticism from his
British superiors. Burns' decline appeared
in his first experience as a Corps commander
in action, the confusion and heavy casualties
of the May 1944 attack on the Hitler Line. It
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became worse when his leadership came under
attack from Generals Leese and Alexander,
criticism so severe that he had to replace
several of his staff officers while his own
position was saved only by the extraordinary
exertions of his Canadian superiors.
Complexity reduction during such periods of
ongoing stress and declining resources to
continue dealing with such stress is predicted
by both stress and complexity theories. 8 And
no wonder. A similar pattern was found in
the complexity changes of General Robert E.
Lee as he endured fatigue, failure and everdiminishing resources during the period from
July 1863 to April 1864 as the American Civil
War turned against the South. 9
Burns' complexity increased during
professional success as pressures and stress
eased between July and September 1944.
His I Canadian Corps successfully attacked
the Gothic Line in September and for a time
Burns basked in the praise of his superiors.
Unfortunately for Burns, his senior
commanders turned on him in October and
forced his ouster. This release from stress led
to increased complexity in October 1944.
Again, General Lee's complexity followed a
similar pattern as he came to accept the need
to surrender at Appomattox.
Burns' memoirs consistently showed a
higher complexity than his writings during
the war, but his retrospective account followed
the same general trends of increase and
decrease. This is an interesting indication
that reflecting upon past events can evoke
reactions similar to those at the time, but-in
relation to crises, at least-perhaps with
greater attention, and a better understanding
of the behaviour of the other protagonists.
Burns was an unusually intelligent and
thoughtful officer, of course; whether the
memoirs of those who did not share such
characteristics would show the same effects
from retrospection remains to be studied.
While there has been a substantial body
of work on political leaders and civilian elites,
relatively little work has been devoted to
studying how battlefield commanders handle
the information they get and upon which they
base their decisions. The importance of their

tactical and strategic choices is obviously
vital, not only to the soldiers under their
command but sometimes to the fate of their
countries. Integrative complexity scoring, a
technique which can be used at a distance,
from available documentary sources, and at
any time during and after an event, seems a
technique that historians might profitably
employ.
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